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WHO SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE?: 
VETO PLAYERS AND PEACE PROCESSES 
IN CIVIL WAR 
David E. Cunningham* 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil war often is conceptualized as a conflict between a state 
and a rebel group. In reality, many civil wars, including those 
currently ongoing in Somalia, Darfur, Afghanistan, Iraq, Columbia, 
and Kashmir, contain multiple rebel groups fighting against the state 
at the same time. Within civil wars, there is a sub-set of these groups 
(which could include all of them) that have the ability to block an end 
to the war. These groups can be labeled “veto players” because they 
have the capacity to veto peace and continue the war on their own 
even if the other groups involved sign a peace agreement and stop 
fighting.1 
                                                 
*, David E. Cunningham, Assistant Professor of International Relations, 
University of Maryland and affiliate of the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the 
Peace Research Institute in Oslo. 
1 See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002) (analyzing veto players in governmental bargaining). 
See generally Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of 
Economic Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21-63 
(Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001). Scholars have examined 
how governmental veto players affect conflict. See Michael J. Ireland & Scott 
Sigmund Gartner, Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary 
Systems, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547 (2001); George Tsebelis & Seung-Whan Choi, 
The Democratic Peace Revisited: It Is Veto Players, APSA Meeting Paper (2009), 
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Civil wars containing more than two veto players have 
fundamentally different bargaining dynamics. The incentives that 
combatants have to enter negotiations and negotiate in good faith, as 
well as their ability to reach agreements that all parties find 
acceptable, are substantially different when there are more actors 
involved that can block settlement. These barriers to bargaining mean 
that conflicts with more veto players last substantially longer than 
those with fewer.2 
Because these conflicts are so difficult to resolve, 
international efforts are much less successful in conflicts that contain 
more than two combatants. Several years ago, a prominent study 
evaluated the success of all United Nations led peacebuilding 
missions and found that the U.N. was “successful” in 13 out of 27 of 
these missions, slightly under 50%.3 Dividing these cases into two-
party and multi-party wars shows that peacebuilding was successful in 
10 out of 16 two-party wars (63%) and only 3 out of 11 multi-party 
civil wars (27%).4 
This article explores how peacemakers can design peace 
processes in multi-party civil wars with the greatest likelihood of 
resolution. It focuses on the question of participation in peace 
processes and argues that negotiations are most likely to lead to a 
comprehensive settlement if they include all of the veto players in the 
war and exclude everyone else. 
                                                 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450519. See also generally 
David E. Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875 
(2006); DAVID E. CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR (2011) 
(examining civil war bargaining through a veto player logic). 
2 See Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, supra note 1 at 876, 
881-87 (arguing that civil wars with more veto players last longer and citing 
empirical evidence of this relationship). See also J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? 
Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L 
AFF. 48 (discussing some of the difficulties for mediation presented by a large 
number of combatants and applying this discussion to the civil was in Syria). 
3 MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR & 
BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 204 (2006). 
4 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at 
204. 
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Section I defines what it means to be a veto player in civil 
war. Section II examines why peace processes are prone to fail if they 
do not include all veto players or include actors that are not veto 
players. Section III explores two potential caveats to these rules, and 
the article concludes by illustrating the applicability of the main 
argument in a few cases. 
I. VETO PLAYERS IN CIVIL WAR 
Veto players have the capability to unilaterally block 
settlement of a civil war. The concept of veto players is different 
from that of spoilers. Spoilers, as defined by Stephen John Stedman, 
are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use 
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”5 Spoilers, then, are 
those actors who have blocked a negotiated settlement to war. Veto 
players are those actors who have the capability to be spoilers, 
whether or not they actually spoil a settlement. At a minimum, all 
civil wars contain two veto players—the government and one rebel 
group—because if either of these actors could not unilaterally 
continue the war it would end. Many civil wars contain more than 
two of these actors, and additional veto players come in a variety of 
types. 
Many civil wars contain multiple rebel group veto players. In 
the 1991-2008 civil war in Burundi, an agreement signed by 19 
groups in Arusha, Tanzania in 2000 failed to end the war because the 
two main rebel groups—the National Council for the Defense of 
Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) 
and Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL)—did 
not sign and continued fighting. In 2003, CNDD-FDD signed the 
Pretoria Accords and exited the conflict. The war still did not end 
because Palipehutu-FNL was a veto player and continued fighting. 
The Burundian war only ended when Palipehutu-FNL signed a peace 
agreement in 2008 and stopped fighting, meaning that all of the rebel 
group veto players had exited the conflict. 
                                                 
5 Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT’L SEC. 5, 
5 (1997). 
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Civil wars can also contain multiple veto players when 
external states are heavily involved in the conflict. During the 
Apartheid era, South Africa used its military to destabilize hostile 
governments such as those in Angola and Mozambique by 
intervening in their civil wars. South Africa was a veto player in these 
wars because it was an actor with independent preferences and an 
ability to prevent full settlement of the conflicts.6 In the Cold War, 
the United States and Soviet Union were veto players in many civil 
wars because they were involved and capable of prolonging the war if 
they did not get the outcome they wanted. 
In general, civil wars contain a set of veto players including 
the government, one or more rebel groups and, potentially, external 
states. Not all of the participants to a civil war, however, are 
necessarily veto players, as some combatants may be so weak that 
they cannot block an end to the war. Identifying veto players is more 
challenging than identifying spoilers. Spoilers are those groups who 
have spoiled an agreement; veto players are those groups who could 
potentially spoil an agreement. In general, the factors that make 
parties veto players are those that make them more of a threat to the 
government, or more able to resist being defeated. So, combatants 
that have greater numbers of troops, more popular support, operate 
in terrain that provides protection from government attacks, have 
more advanced military technology and better trained and equipped 
troops, and have access to funding sources are more likely to be veto 
players. 
II. TWO RULES FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES 
Negotiations in civil war can be long processes, often 
dragging on for months or even years. Mediators can affect the 
likelihood for a peaceful resolution to a war by deciding who to invite 
to participate in peace processes. There are two general rules. 
                                                 
6 See David E. Cunningham, Blocking Resolution: How External States Can 
Prolong Civil Wars, J. PEACE RES. 115, 116-17 (2010) (analyzing the effect of external 
state veto players on the duration of civil wars). 
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Rule # 1: Include All Veto Players 
The first rule is that peace processes are more likely to 
succeed that include the entire array of relevant veto players.7 
Because veto players can continue the war unilaterally, if one or more 
of these actors are not included in a peace process then the war will 
continue even if the other veto players sign an agreement and stop 
fighting.8 
This argument may seem obvious, but there are clear cases in 
which mediators proceed with negotiations not involving all veto 
players and expect these processes to succeed. In the 1998-2000 
Arusha negotiations in Burundi, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL 
did not participate because the facilitator, former Tanzanian 
President Julius Nyerere, barred them from doing so. As those two 
groups were the main anti-government combatants, without their 
inclusion the Arusha process was doomed to fail before it began. 
Another example is the negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinian group Fatah in the late 1990s. Those negotiations failed to 
lead to a comprehensive settlement of that long-running dispute for a 
number of reasons. One important reason was that Fatah was not the 
only Palestinian veto player, it did not control Hamas, and so an 
accord between the Israeli government and only one of the 
Palestinian veto players could not possibly have ended the violence. 
One reason that peace processes often proceed without all 
veto players is that it is difficult to get them to come to the table. In 
ongoing civil wars, many of these actors have incentives to hold out 
from negotiating in hopes of obtaining a better deal later on. 
                                                 
7 See UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION 11-12 
(2012), http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN 
%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf (recognizing the importance 
of inclusivity in peace processes, although this source refers to “stakeholders”: a 
broader range of actors than veto players). 
8 Lakhdar Brahimi & Salman Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The 
Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation, N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION 5 (2008) 
(stating that the failure to incorporate all veto players can be the result of 
ignorance—one of the “seven deadly sins of mediation” —and arguing that it is 
important for mediators to identify both the national actors with the power to stop 
or re-start the war, and the source of those actors’ external support). 
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Additionally, some of these groups may be opposed to negotiation as 
a matter of principle. 
In cases where not all veto players will agree to negotiate, 
mediators often try one of two strategies. They may declare that 
negotiations will begin with the parties who are willing to participate 
and that everyone else will be excluded from the peace that follows. 
This strategy was tried in Darfur in 2007 when the main rebel groups 
refused to attend a peace conference in Sirte, Libya. Jan Eliasson, the 
mediator for the conference, stated emphatically: “The train has left 
on the road to peace . . . the question is how many passengers will 
come on.”9 The problem with this strategy is that, if the main 
combatants are not participating, there is no credible threat to 
exclude them from the benefits of peace because no peace is 
possible. Despite Eliasson’s statement, the conference was postponed 
and the conflict continued. 
Alternatively, mediators often try piecemeal negotiations, in 
which governments negotiate with rebel groups individually in 
sequence. This strategy was used in Chad in the 1990s where the 
government signed a series of bilateral agreements with rebel groups. 
While sequenced bilateral negotiations may work in some 
cases, it is a problematic strategy. Every agreement that results in one 
rebel group exiting the conflict also results in a shift in the balance of 
power between the government and the remaining groups. One of 
the difficulties with finding a bargained solution to civil war is that it 
is difficult for actors to tell how strong they are, relative to the 
government. In Burundi, it was clear after the Pretoria Accord that 
Palipehutu-FNL was weaker relative to the combined Burundian 
army/CNDD-FDD forces but it took years to determine how much 
weaker. 
Additionally, every new peace agreement reduces the 
government’s flexibility with the remaining groups. Peace agreements 
often commit specific cabinet ministries and percentages of the 
                                                 
9 Alfred De Montesquiou, Darfur Talks Postponed as Rebels Boycott, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-
28-2864852227_x.htm. 
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military and government to former rebels. As these positions are 
filled, it becomes harder for the government to use incentives to 
convince the remaining veto players that an agreement is better than 
fighting. Because of these problems, piecemeal negotiations should 
be a last resort for mediators. 
Rule #2: Exclude Non-Veto Players 
The second rule is that peace processes are more likely to 
succeed that exclude actors that are not veto players. Because 
negotiations with more parties are more prone to fail, incorporating 
actors that are not veto players in peace processes make it less likely 
that agreement will be reached by the veto players. Barring this 
agreement, wars continue. 
A number of peace processes in recent years have included 
non-veto players. The 19 parties at the Arusha negotiations in the 
Burundian war included some armed groups but primarily unarmed 
political parties. Negotiations in Paris in January 2003 to resolve the 
Cote D’Ivoire civil war included the government, the three main 
insurgent groups, and delegations from six other political parties.10 
Mediators may include non-veto players in peace processes 
because these processes often play a large role in determining the 
post-conflict political environment, including the design of political 
institutions and timetable for transition to elections. Limiting 
participation to armed groups has the potential to send the dangerous 
signal that the only way to get one’s voice heard is through violence. 
Additionally, civil wars often occur because of deep divisions in 
society, and incorporating civil society and political parties may be 
attempts to overcome these divisions.11 
                                                 
10 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, LINAS-MARCOUSSIS 
AGREEMENT (2003), http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_ 
agreements/cote_divoire_01242003en.pdf. 
11 See generally Desirée Nilsson, Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in 
Peace Accords and Durable Peace, 38 INT’L INTERACTIONS 243 (2012) (arguing that 
incorporating civil society actors into peace agreements increases the durability of 
peace). 
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Each of these justifications has merit. However, including 
non-veto players in peace processes makes them more prone to fail 
for two reasons. First, incorporating these groups may actually create 
additional veto players in the negotiation. Conflicts with many veto 
players are longer and harder to resolve in part because it is hard to 
convince all of the participants that they are better off through peace 
than through continuing to fight. If unarmed groups are brought into 
a peace process and can veto any potential agreement, that increases 
the number of actors that can prevent a settlement that might end the 
war. 
Second, even if non-veto players incorporated into peace 
processes are not allowed to veto potential agreements, their 
participation virtually guarantees that they will be given something in 
a settlement. Any concessions given to these groups, however 
minimal, means there are less concessions available to induce the 
veto players to stop fighting. In a power-sharing government, for 
example, the number of important ministries is finite. Ministries 
given to non-veto players mean less are available to convince veto 
players that peace is more beneficial than war. 
Combining these two rules, peace processes will be most 
likely to succeed in ending civil wars when they include all of the veto 
players involved and no one else. Mediators are most likely to design 
successful peace processes when they analyze conflicts and determine 
who the veto players are and think critically about the effect of 
including and excluding different actors on those processes. 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES 
The above discussion presumed that each veto player was 
capable of continuing a war if a peace process did not include them. 
However, mediators could proceed with peace processes excluding 
veto players if international actors were willing to forcibly disarm 
groups that blocked the peace. This may be necessary when veto 
players are completely opposed to negotiation. In Rwanda, for 
example, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was a 
clear spoiler that worked to prevent the implementation of the 
Arusha Accords. Had the international community intervened to 
nullify CDR, it is possible that the Arusha Accords would have 
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worked and the genocide would have been prevented.12 In general, 
however, international actors are unwilling to intervene to the degree 
necessary to forcibly disarm veto players. 
The above discussion also assumed that the goal of peace 
processes is to end wars. If that is the goal, then these processes are 
most likely to succeed if they include all, and only, the veto players. 
However, in many cases mediators and others may have interests 
beyond just ending the fighting, such as promoting democratization 
or social justice. To pursue those goals, it is possible that some veto 
players should be excluded or some non-veto players included.13 
Mediators should be cautious about this, however. In many 
cases, goals such as democratization or social justice can only be 
pursued once civil war ends. Prioritizing other important goals can be 
dangerous if it leads to the design of peace processes that are less 
likely to actually end the war. 
IV. CONCLUSION—THE RULES IN ACTION 
The peace process around the 1999 Lusaka Accords in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one in which mediators 
included all veto players and excluded non-veto players from direct 
negotiation.14 Early rounds of negotiations in the conflict had been 
derailed because they only included the DRC government and 
external state participants (such as Rwanda and Uganda). However, 
Congolese rebel groups were clearly veto players, and the Lusaka 
Peace Process incorporated them. At the same time, the Lusaka 
process left out non-veto players such as political parties and civil 
society organizations. These groups were not completely excluded 
                                                 
12 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at 
184, 211, 214. For a more extensive discussion of the Rwandan peace process, see 
id. at ch. 4. 
13 Beardsley discusses how the best strategies for mediators may differ 
depending on whether they aspire to a cessation of hostilities or to build long-term 
peace. See generally Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and 
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013). 
14 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at 
ch. 6 (describing the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
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from political discussion, rather, they were incorporated into an 
“Inter-Congolese Dialogue” which was designed to decide the 
political future of the country. 
The DRC civil war ended in 2002, largely along the lines laid 
out by the Lusaka Accords. For the last ten years the DRC has 
certainly not been a peaceful, stable, or democratic place. However, 
the level of violence in Congo is much lower than it was during the 
civil war, at least in part as a result of the Lusaka process. 
Despite this example, mediators often make decisions about 
participation in peace processes that hamper, rather than augment, 
the chances of peace. In Burundi and Darfur, negotiations excluded 
veto players and included non-veto players and failed to produce 
peace. Peace is possible in multi-party conflicts, but only if 
peacemakers understand their unique dynamics and design and 
implement processes responsive to these dynamics. 
 
